For more information on ending corporate dominanceand corporate personhood visit the Redwood Coast Alliance ForDemocracy web site:
What about past harms done by corporate personhood?
[*112] Foucault has said that "the soul is the prison of the body" (1977, 30). Perhaps it is the notion that a corporation has no soul (from Innocent IV, lifted into English law by Sir Edward Coke and Blackstone) that has allowed the corporate person to so far outstrip its human origins that it now threatens to consume the earth in a mad war for global domination. Perhaps the antidote to law's soulless corporation is human self-awareness and mutual association not for profit. Whatever the merits of these speculations, the fact remains that the subsumption of "natural persons" within "legal personality"—the ruling idea of the ruling institutions in our day—is synonymous with the denial of existence, the sacrifice of life.
How will revoking corporate personhood affect non-profitcorporations?
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the United States Conference of Mayors also determines that the most urgent action needed is to reverse the impacts of United States Supreme Court Citizens United (2010) decision and the door it opens for unlimited independent campaign expenditures by corporations that contributes to the undermining impacts that “corporate personhood” has on free and fair elections and effective self-governance; and
Why don't unions have corporate personhood?
[*100] My purpose in this essay is to explore the doctrine of "corporate personality," to deconstruct the metaphor of legal "being," to reveal it "as an intersection of competing discourses… as a point of fracture in which different systems of signs are transposed, translated and articulated" (Goodrich 1986, 220).The "fiction" concept of corporate personality claims a Roman pedigree. Gierke refers to a tradition snaking back through the Middle Ages to Pope Innocent IV (pontificate 1243-54) who relied on phrases in Justinian's Digest to declare that church "bodies" could own property as "persons." The difference between the Roman and German traditions, as Maitland pointed out, is between an abstract institution existing only in contemplation of law and a "living group" existing as a sovereign expression of its members.Maitland suggested that this Germanic concept of "real" corporate personality might legitimize the economic and political reality that was emerging in America and England. It would allow law to take the side of the corporation against the state, [*101] not simply where the state had already provided for specific protections but in a generalized way, on behalf of self-directed corporate autonomy, a form of group sovereignty. As the source of their own legitimacy, "real" legal "persons" would be in a position to negotiate with the state. "Fictional" legal persons, on the other hand, were dependent on state authority for their existence and legitimacy. They were subsumed in state sovereignty. Their existence was entirely "feigned" by the law.However satisfying to corporate lawyers, the concept was troubling for jurisprudence. As Maitland suggested, the growing power and increasing recognition of corporate "persons" demanded attention to the philosophical foundation of legal personality itself. Was corporate personality an expression of "some deep-set truth" or simply a "product of mankind's [read the law's] propensity to feign"? Was the corporate person "real" or "artificial"? On this question depended the legitimacy of the state, as well as of the corporate entities.